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This article argues that the failure of Northern Ireland’s first power-sharing executive, 
and subsequent attempts to restore power-sharing during the 1970s, was the result 
of conflicting attitudes towards devolution among Northern Ireland’s politicians. 
Traditional ideological divisions between nationalists and unionists were not the 
primary barrier to creating and sustaining cross-community institutions, as stressed 
in accounts of this period premised on consociational theory. Drawing extensively 
from archival sources, it argues that the split between the pragmatists from both 
communities, prepared to compromise their core principles and accept power-
sharing devolution within a United Kingdom (UK) framework, and the dogmatists 
(both nationalists and unionists) who refused to contemplate any compromise to their 
core position prevented a consensual political settlement emerging during the 1970s.  
Introduction  
Between 1921 and 1972, Northern Ireland’s devolved administration was led, 
exclusively, by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). In 1972, Northern Ireland’s 
parliament, Stormont, was prorogued by the British government amidst a 
deteriorating security situation (Hennessey, 2007). However, devolution returned to 
the region in January 1974. Following protracted negotiations in 1973, nationalist 
and unionist politicians agreed to form the region’s first power-sharing executive.  On 
28 May 1974, however, the executive collapsed in the face of a political strike 
organised by the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC). The UWC comprised loyalist 
paramilitaries, Protestant trades unionists, and unionist politicians opposed to the 
Sunningdale Agreement (Anderson, 1994; Fisk, 1975). The Sunningdale Agreement, 
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concluded in December 1973, cemented the power-sharing structures in Northern 
Ireland, and provided for the establishment of a Council of Ireland to facilitate co-
operation between the executive and the government of the Irish Republic (Faulkner, 
1978, pp. 202-25). In the aftermath of the strike, direct rule from London was 
reintroduced. Further attempts to restore devolution to Northern Ireland were made 
during the 1970s, but these efforts came to naught. 
 Several attempts have been made to explain both the failure of the first 
power-sharing executive, and subsequent attempts to restore power-sharing in 
Northern Ireland during the 1970s. Explanations premised on consociational theory 
dominate the scholarly literature. Consociational structures involve the imposition of 
elite power-sharing between competing groups to regulate conflict in a divided 
society (Lijphart, 1969; see also Bogaards, 2000). Consociational power-sharing is 
premised on the notion that ethnic cleavages are durable. It is not the only kind of 
power-sharing, however. Power-sharing can also be integrationist. Integrative power-
sharing is designed to reward moderates, and encourage co-operation across 
communal lines (Dixon, 2005; Horowitz, 2001; Wolff, 2006).   
In the Northern Ireland case, consociationalism refers to power- sharing 
between Irish nationalists and British unionists. Scholars analysing Northern Ireland 
through the prism of consociationalism, such as Kerr and O’Leary, focus on the 
ethnic divisions between Irish nationalists and British unionists (e.g. McGarry and 
O’Leary, 1995; 2004).1 These divisions, it is argued, require enforced power-sharing 
structures to regulate the political conflict in the region.  Advocates of 
consociationalism claim that it was only when the British, and to a lesser extent, 
Irish, governments pursued a solution based on consociational principles, by 
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imposing power-sharing, that the conflict could be regulated (O’Leary, 2003; 
Tannam, 2001; Kerr, 2005; O’Duffy, 2007).  
A dominant trope in this literature is that power-sharing could have succeeded 
during the 1970s if the British Labour government had imposed it (Kerr, 2005; 2011; 
O’Leary, 2004).  This argument is made despite the widespread opposition to such a 
settlement of most unionists, and indeed militant republicans. Nevertheless, Harold 
Wilson’s Labour government is chided by Kerr for abandoning power-sharing, 
ostensibly as a prequel to extricating itself from Northern Ireland (Kerr, 2011, p 13).  
Likewise, O’Leary accused Wilson’s administration of ‘abject spinelessness’ during 
the UWC strike (O’Leary, 2004, p. 196). These scholars therefore presume that the 
failure to successfully regulate the divisions between British unionists and Irish 
nationalists by imposing power-sharing explains the collapse of the first power-
sharing experiment and the persistence of the conflict thereafter. Their logic appears 
to be that because quasi-consociational power-sharing structures play a role in 
regulating political divisions in Northern Ireland (in a totally different context) a similar 
settlement could have been arrived at much earlier. It was only when the British (and 
Irish) governments ‘learned’ how to regulate the conflict, that a solution became 
possible (Tannam, 2001).   
This article argues that explanations influenced by consociational theory 
misinterpret the political dynamics within both nationalism and unionism during the 
1970s. It demonstrates that neither the ethnic differences nor the alleged 
governmental inaction stressed by the consociationalists properly explains the 
collapse of power-sharing, and the subsequent failures to restore it during that 
decade. Exploring political attitudes towards devolution offers an alternative 
explanation for the failure of power-sharing. The main obstacle to power-sharing was 
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the gulf between the pragmatists on both sides, prepared to compromise core 
ideological principles, and the dogmatists who refused to countenance any 
diminution of their objectives. Pragmatists were willing to accept power-sharing 
within a UK framework; dogmatists, including those who favoured devolution, were 
not. Dogmatic unionists sought the exclusion of nationalists from government and 
the restoration of the pre-1972 unionist dominated parliament, while dogmatic 
nationalists violently pursued a united Ireland against the wishes of the majority.  
It is important to note that the terms ‘pragmatist’ and ‘dogmatist’ do not reflect 
a value judgement on the part of the author. Classifying a person or group as 
‘dogmatic’, in particular, might be construed as pejorative, or imply that a certain 
policy position may have been motivated by intransigence rather than political logic. 
To reiterate: the terms are used merely as a way of explaining particular political 
divisions between those who were prepared to countenance a diminution in their 
core ideological goals and those who were not. It is important to note, also, that 
dogmatism was not always synonymous with support for violence: the vast majority 
of dogmatists actually opposed it.   
Cillian McGrattan has rebuked consociationalists for failing to engage with the 
increasing body of documentary evidence in British and Irish archives (McGrattan, 
2010a).2  This article, by contrast, extensively interrogates this material as well as 
party policy documents and contemporary newspapers. It refutes the claim that 
power-sharing could have been imposed during the 1970s. Such an argument 
ignores empirical evidence to the contrary, particularly the extent of popular 
opposition to power-sharing. It also presumes homogeneity within nationalist and 
unionist political blocs, when instead these groups were internally divided. By 
focusing on the secondary cleavage of attitudes towards devolution, the article 
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demonstrates both the commitment to power-sharing devolution of successive British 
governments and that government inaction, or failure to learn, cannot explain the 
failure of power-sharing initiatives during the 1970s (Tannam, 2001; Cochrane, 2013, 
pp. 95-6). 
 
The collapse of the executive 
In November 1973, following discussions led by the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, a power-sharing executive was formed comprising the UUP, the 
constitutional nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the non-
sectarian Alliance Party (McDaid, 2013, p. 24).3 This represented a considerable 
moderation in policy on behalf of both the UUP and SDLP. Following the collapse of 
Stormont, both parties published dogmatic policy documents, which appeared to 
eschew compromise.  
In September 1972, the UUP ruled out power-sharing with those whose 
‘primary aim’ was to take Northern Ireland out of the UK (UUP, 1972). This policy 
was influenced by pressure from Ulster Vanguard, an anti-reformist faction within the 
UUP. That same month, the SDLP published a document calling for a ‘new’ united 
Ireland, free from British interference (SDLP, 1972). More extreme parties on both 
sides, including the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Provisional Sinn Féin 
(PSF), also rejected a power-sharing settlement. The DUP, at this time, favoured 
integration with the rest of the UK (Walker, 2004, p. 213). Nevertheless, the following 
year, both the UUP and SDLP leaderships pursued a more pragmatic approach, and 
displayed a willingness to share power. 
This moderation was forced upon the parties by the policies of the British 
government. In March 1973, the Conservative government published a White Paper 
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entitled the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The White Paper sought the 
restoration of a devolution to Northern Ireland, but not if the government was 
supported by only one section of the community (McDaid, 2013, p. 17). This meant 
that devolution could not return in the absence of power-sharing.  
The UUP leader, Brian Faulkner, refused to reject the White Paper out of 
hand. This prompted the departure of Ulster Vanguard from his party. Vanguard 
formed a new party, the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP), and promised 
to wreck the power-sharing Assembly (Ulster Vanguard, 1973). A further split 
developed in the UUP in advance of Assembly elections in June 1973. Ten of the 
UUP’s thirty-nine candidates refused to support Faulkner’s seemingly ambiguous 
position regarding power-sharing. This group was led by Harry West, a former 
Stormont minister (McDaid, 2013, p. 19). The UUP’s unwieldy party structure made it 
particularly susceptible to splits and factionalism. Its governing body gave delegates 
from the Orange Order who may have been affiliated with other parties a say in 
influencing policy (Walker, 2004, p. 262).4  
Faulkner had stated that the UUP would not share power with any party 
whose ‘primary objective’ was breaking with the UK. This left the possibility of power-
sharing open, since Faulkner argued that breaking the union could not be the 
‘primary objective’ of a party willing to operate within a devolved UK administration 
(Faulkner, 1978, p. 194). This was unacceptable to West’s grouping. Nevertheless, 
the majority of the UUP followed Faulkner into the power-sharing executive.  
A majority of unionists, however, including West’s faction of the UUP, rejected 
the new institutions. Ian Paisley’s DUP was the most dogmatic unionist group. It 
refused to countenance the notion of Catholics in government. DUP member T. E. 
Burns informed the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, that ‘it was impossible to get on 
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with Roman Catholics whose attitude was feckless and irresponsible.’ Paisley was 
equally uncompromising, claiming that loyalists could only be reassured if Catholics 
became ‘fully integrated in the political life of the Province’ (National Archives (TNA), 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 87/283, note of a meeting between the 
Prime Minister and leaders of the Democratic Unionist Party, 29 August 1973). This 
would effectively have necessitated the SDLP renouncing its (constitutional) 
nationalism and becoming unionists.   
The power-sharing administration was also attacked by dogmatic nationalists. 
The political wing of the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), the Republican Clubs, 
criticised the ‘British imposed’ Sunningdale settlement (Sinn Féin Official/Northern 
Republican Clubs, 1973). Meanwhile, Provisional Sinn Féin (PSF) accused the 
SDLP of becoming the ‘New Unionist Party’, for sharing power with the UUP (An 
Phoblacht, 8 March 1974). More ominously, PSF’s ‘colleagues’ in the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) scorned the executive, and continued its indiscriminate 
campaign of violence throughout its tenure (English, 2003, pp. 165-6). Loyalist 
paramilitaries did likewise.  
These events demonstrate that the most important obstacle to power-sharing 
was not the ethnic divisions between Irish nationalists and British unionists stressed 
by consociationalists (O’Duffy, 2007). A power-sharing executive was formed 
comprising members of these two groups in accordance with government policy. 
Rather, it was the internal divisions within these groups that undermined the 
prospects for power-sharing. Pragmatists on both sides recognised that devolved 
power-sharing within a UK framework was the only alternative to direct rule. 
Dogmatists must also have recognised this, but continued to pursue unrealistic, 
hard-line goals. These internal divisions assumed greater significance following the 
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Sunningdale agreement in December 1973 and the executive’s accession to office in 
January 1974.    
The extent of dogmatic opposition to the power-sharing executive became 
apparent just over a month after it took office. In February 1974, Edward Heath 
called a general election in the UK in the midst of a dispute with the National Union 
of Mineworkers. In Northern Ireland, however, the election was contested solely on 
the basis of support for the Sunningdale agreement.  It provided the executive’s 
opponents with an opportunity to undermine its authority, and stoke unionist fears 
about the proposed Council of Ireland.  Anti-Sunningdale unionists (DUP, VUPP, 
unpledged UUP and independents) organised under the banner of the United Ulster 
Unionist Coalition (UUUC), and won eleven of the twelve Northern Ireland seats. 
Only one pro-power-sharing candidate was elected, the SDLP leader, Gerry Fitt. 
Thus, whilst a majority of unionists sought the return of devolution, most would 
forego this if it meant power-sharing or closer symbolic co-operation with the Dublin 
government.  
The general election seriously damaged the executive, but its fate was sealed 
by the paramilitary-backed UWC strike in May 1974, the zenith of anti-reformist 
unionist unity (See Anderson, 1994; Fisk, 1975). The UWC demanded fresh 
Assembly elections in light of the February election results. Fears of the proposed 
Council of Ireland, which had been much trumpeted by the SDLP, were also 
significant in garnering unionist support for the strike (Aveyard, 2012, p. 532). The 
UWC claimed the proposed Council of Ireland would place Northern Ireland under 
the ‘shackles of Rome.’ Northern Ireland was, the UWC asserted, ‘the last bastion of 
the Protestant Faith left in Europe’, which was what the strike was ‘really about’ 
(UWC News Sheet, No. 15, May 1974).  
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The strike gathered widespread support in the unionist community, and the 
executive collapsed just two weeks later, to the delight of both loyalists and militant 
republicans. The British Prime Minister arguably ensured the success of the strike, 
with what he later admitted was a ‘provocative and bitter’ speech on 25 May. Wilson 
accused unionists of ‘sponging on Westminster’, whilst simultaneously assaulting the 
democratic institutions of the British state. His remarks caused a surge in support for 
the UWC (Wilson, 1979, p. 76). 
Militant republicans, notably the PIRA, had undermined the executive by its 
campaign of violence, particularly intense in border regions (Patterson, 2013). A 
contemporary British Army report claimed that ‘terrorists operating from the Republic’ 
caused a surge in violence in these areas, which further undercut unionist support 
for the new institutions (Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), Office of 
the Executive (OE)1/28, Reynolds to Goddard, 30 January 1974). PSF also 
castigated the SDLP for participating in the executive, labelling it as a ‘gang of self-
seeking individuals’ that had failed to bring Irish unity any closer (An Phoblacht, 31 
May 1974).  
Michael Kerr has argued that the executive might have survived had the 
Labour government taken firmer action against the UWC strike: ‘In failing to uphold 
constitutional government in Northern Ireland, Wilson was rejecting the idea that the 
British could or should provide a solution to Ireland’s ancient troubles, either by 
imposing power-sharing or through some other form of direct rule from Westminster’ 
(Kerr, 2011, p. xiv).  This echoes the argument of McGarry and O’Leary (1995, p. 
362), who claim that the change of government in Great Britain in February 1974 
adversely affected the executive’s chances of survival. However, there is no 
persuasive evidence to support their claims.  
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More recently, Feargal Cochrane has asserted that Wilson’s government 
abrogated its responsibility by its ‘failure to confront the hard-line loyalists and 
support the power-sharing executive.’ Cochrane claims that Wilson had little political 
capital in the executive and left it to ‘wither and die’ (Cochrane, 2013, 95-6). These 
arguments are an extension of the logic of consociational accounts of the Northern 
Ireland conflict: that enforcing power-sharing in the 1970s might have ‘regulated’ the 
conflict. But elements within both ethnic groups were already prepared to share 
power: this was no longer the key obstacle to progress.  
These explanations conflate what consociationalists believe to be the root 
causes of conflict with the reasons why it persisted. Their arguments take little 
account of popular opposition to power-sharing, and the fact that power-sharing was 
not, in itself, a peace process. Therefore, it was opposition from dogmatic wings of 
both unionism and nationalism (some of which took a violent form) that scuppered 
the chances of power-sharing, not the government’s failure to impose it. Likewise, 
republican and loyalist violence continued despite the executive. And, as Kerr (2011, 
p. 246) acknowledges, loyalists celebrated the executive’s collapse ‘as if it was VE 
day.’ Republicans, likewise, delighted in the executive’s demise. Imposing power-
sharing in these circumstances may only have worsened the violence. In the 
aftermath of the UWC strike, the split between pragmatists and dogmatists on both 
sides became more pronounced. 
 
The Constitutional Convention 
Despite the success of the UWC strike, the government reaffirmed that power-
sharing was an absolute requirement if devolution was to return. In the immediate 
aftermath of the strike, the Prime Minister wrote to his Principal Private Secretary 
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explaining that ‘realism suggests that power-sharing is an objective we must 
continue to proclaim’ (TNA, Prime Minister’s Office (PREM)16/148, Wilson to Robert 
Armstrong, 30 May 1974). Privately, Wilson informed opposition leader, Edward 
Heath, that Labour would not ‘countenance anything resembling a return to 
Stormont’ (TNA, PREM16/149, Note for the record, meeting between the Prime 
Minister and the leader of the opposition, 3 July, 1974). This was confirmed that 
same month, when the government published its White Paper, The Northern Ireland 
Constitution. The document unambiguously stated that there ‘must be some form of 
power-sharing and partnership because no political system will survive, or be 
supported, unless there is widespread acceptance of it within the community’. This 
required participation ‘by the whole community’ (Northern Ireland Office, 1974). 
Consistent with this approach, the White Paper outlined the government’s 
plans to hold a Constitutional Convention, comprising local politicians, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Robert Lowry, ‘to consider what provisions for the government of 
Northern Ireland would be likely to command the most widespread acceptance 
throughout the community there.’ A repeat of the 1973 settlement was still desired, 
but it was recognised that there was ‘little prospect’ of this happening (NIO, 1974). 
Wilson realised that there was little likelihood of the Convention succeeding. Indeed, 
the Cabinet Secretary informed him it was ‘likely to fail’ (TNA, PREM 16/151, 
Northern Ireland: Future Trends of Policy (IRN (74) 22), 23 October 1974). 
Nevertheless, the plans proceeded, with Convention elections held in May 1975. The 
primary electoral battle was between the parties prepared to embrace compromise 
and those that were not.  
The SDLP’s Convention election manifesto sought to reassure unionists that it 
had no wish to force them into a united Ireland. The document stressed power-
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sharing and an Irish dimension, but also recognised the ‘British dimension’ in 
Northern Ireland. Any solution, it stated, ‘must take account of both’ (SDLP, 1975a). 
Most unionists, however, were unconvinced: in the subsequent election, the UUUC 
won 46 of the 78 Convention seats. Parties willing to compromise, on both sides, 
received approximately 42 per cent of the vote; dogmatists, however, were in the 
majority with approximately 56 per cent of the vote.5 The proceedings of the 
Convention illustrate further the widening gulf between the dogmatic and pragmatic 
camps, and how important intra-group divisions were in the failure to find a power-
sharing solution.  
Consistent with its manifesto, the SDLP largely maintained a conciliatory tone 
during the Convention. Gerry Fitt stated that his party was dissatisfied with the ‘long 
distance’ government under direct rule. What the region needed was ‘Northern 
Ireland people to represent the interests of their own constituents … irrespective of 
party political differences’ (Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention – Report of 
Debates (Convention Debates), 8 May 1975, p. 5). Both Fitt and his party colleague, 
Ivan Cooper, called for a strong legislative assembly, with power-sharing at every 
level (Convention Debates, 28 May 1975, p. 55).  
Even John Hume, often classified as one of the party’s more nationalist 
members, publicly supported Fitt’s position. Hume called for the replacement of 
direct rule with ‘direct rule by the people of Northern Ireland through their own 
administration’ – effectively a return of the Sunningdale package (Convention 
Debates, 19 June 1975). Further attempts to reassure unionists were made the 
following month, when Fitt confirmed that the SDLP accepted ‘that Northern Ireland 
is part of the United Kingdom’ (Convention Debates, 1 July 1975, p. 379). More 
remarkably, the party publicly recognised the ‘financial and economic advantages 
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which Northern Ireland presently derives from its membership of the United 
Kingdom’ (SDLP, 1975b). Thus, whilst ultimately favouring a united Ireland, the 
SDLP was realistic enough to accept that this was unachievable for the foreseeable 
future. Instead, it pursued the compromise settlement supported by the British 
government, of power-sharing devolution within the UK. Only some unionists, 
however, were prepared to accept the SDLP posed little actual threat to the union. 
The former Chief Minister of the executive, Brian Faulkner, was one such 
unionist. His Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI), formed in September 1974, 
supported the return of devolution and believed in sharing power with the SDLP, 
‘right at the top level’.6 Faulkner was convinced that ‘if the majority in Northern 
Ireland thought that the province was positively going to remain in the U.K., then that 
majority would overwhelmingly support a government with responsibility shared 
between the two main communities’ (O’Connor and Kiely, 1975). Faulkner, having 
governed with the SDLP, believed in its commitment to working for the benefit of 
Northern Ireland within agreed devolved structures. Other unionists, however, were 
in no mood for compromise.  
Faulkner’s successor as UUP leader, Harry West, favoured the return of 
devolution, but only without power-sharing (Convention Debates, 17 June 1975, p. 
231). He argued that any executive should function in the ‘normal British way’: the 
largest party should attempt to form a government, coalitions should be voluntary, 
and there should be an opposition. In a reference to the SDLP, West warned that 
unionists would ‘not be prepared to tolerate any constitution which, by some 
contrived arrangement, places on the ultimate steering wheel of government the 
hand of anybody who is not acceptable to the majority’ (O’Connor and McKittrick, 
1975). The majority, however, clearly wanted devolution to return. Fearing a loss of 
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support, the ever-populist DUP renounced integration and proclaimed its support for 
the return of Stormont-style devolution. Paisley castigated the Wilson administration, 
which he accused of governing Northern Ireland ‘in a manner worse than the 
Colonies’ (Convention Debates, 17 June 1975, p. 240). He ruled out power-sharing 
since the ‘people of Northern Ireland had rejected the S.D.L.P.’s demand to be in the 
Cabinet’ (O’Connor and McKittrick, 1975).  
The VUPP was divided on policy during the Convention. A majority of its 
members, such as Belfast’s Reg Empey, sought the return of devolution. Others, 
such as Kennedy Lindsay, flirted with the concept of dominion status for Northern 
Ireland (Convention Debates, 17 June 1975, p. 240). What united the vast majority of 
VUPP members was their dogmatic opposition to power-sharing. However, the party 
leader, William Craig, caused consternation when he joined the ranks of the 
pragmatists by publicly supporting the formation of an emergency coalition with the 
SDLP. The SDLP’s conduct at the Convention convinced Craig that it was prepared 
to accept ‘the decision that Ulster remains inside the United Kingdom for as long as 
the majority of our people want that’ (Convention Debates, 1 October 1975, pp. 337-
8). Craig’s plan was denounced by Paisley and most members of the VUPP. His 
plan was also unacceptable to the SDLP, since it did not constitute power-sharing as 
of right (McLoughlin, 2010, p. 75). Nevertheless, Craig continued to advocate the 
idea, and, consequently, ended his political career in failure. 
In November 1975, the Convention published its report which, unsurprisingly, 
reflected the wishes of the UUUC majority. It rejected power-sharing and called for 
both the return of a Stormont-style, majority rule legislature and increased 
representation for Northern Ireland at Westminster (NIO, 1975). In an attempt to 
salvage something from the proceedings, the Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, held 
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a series of inter-party discussions and reconvened the Convention in February 1976. 
However, the UUUC was no less dogmatic in its opposition to sharing power with the 
SDLP.7 
Kerr has suggested that the UUUC had no ‘practical or ideological points of 
opposition to the idea of forming a coalition government’ during the course of the 
Convention (Kerr, 2011, p. 305). However, most of its members had denounced 
Craig’s voluntary coalition proposals. Indeed, Paisley informed the Convention 
Chairman that ‘in the UUUC there was insuperable opposition to SDLP in the 
Cabinet’ (PRONI, CONV/1/2, Chairman’s meeting with Dr Paisley, 6 September 
1975). Likewise, as Kerr notes, Paisley suggested that SDLP members would have 
to abandon their Irish passports and swear an oath to the state to be acceptable in 
government, which in effect meant the UUUC was ideologically opposed to forming a 
coalition government with anyone other than political unionists (Kerr, 2011, p. 306).  
The UUUC’s dogmatism was matched by republican paramilitaries during this 
time. Despite the PIRA engaging in discussions with the government during the so-
called ‘truce’ of 1975-76, the republican movement refused to accept anything less 
than its key demand: the withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland (Taylor, 
1997; compare Ó Dochartaigh, 2011). Indeed, the ceasefire, which was marred by 
breaches and intra-republican feuding, may only have lasted as long as it did 
because the PIRA took seriously the suggestion from British interlocutors that the 
government was willing to consider withdrawal. This was designed to keep the PIRA 
in negotiations for as long as possible, diminishing its military capacity without 
making serious concessions. As Merlyn Rees later noted, ‘we set out to con them, 
and we did’ (Ryan, 1994, p. 58).  
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Despite the bitterness inspired by the Convention, there were still those, on 
both sides prepared to embrace compromise in the hope of finding a solution. The 
dogmatists, however, numerically stronger, continued to press for total victory.   
 
The aftermath of the Convention 
The period following the Convention has been portrayed as one where the positions 
of both nationalist and unionist parties became more hard-line. Cillian McGrattan 
(2010, p. 105) has also argued that the SDLP (in concert with the Irish government) 
pursued ‘maximalist policies that were at odds with the sentiments of the unionist 
community. Further, it has been claimed that despite repackaging some of its 
policies, the SDLP reverted to a more nationalist (‘green’) outlook (Bew and 
Patterson, 1985, pp. 98-9). Contemporary evidence, however, demonstrates that 
events were more complicated than these accounts suggest. Certainly, the SDLP 
was divided, and some its membership favoured calling for a British statement of 
intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland. Overall, however, it never fully abandoned 
a policy of power-sharing within the UK. Neither did pragmatic unionists, notably 
Brian Faulkner’s UPNI. Only dogmatic unionists, and paramilitary groups, continued 
to reject compromise.   
There were some policy divisions within the SDLP. Some favoured calling for 
a British declaration of intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland. In January 1976, 
Gerry Fitt informed Sean Donlon of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs that 
around ‘seven members of his party might possibly go for the declaration of intent 
idea’. Fitt himself, however, was against it. He also felt confident of ‘the complete 
backing’ of his deputy John Hume in this attitude (National Archives, Ireland (NAI), 
Department of the Taoiseach (DT), 2006/133/691, Note by Sean Donlon: Northern 
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Ireland, 8 January 1976). The SDLP still sought compromise with unionists. In 
February, it published an advertisement in the unionist Belfast News Letter calling for 
partnership between the two traditions, and reaffirming its ‘full support for the police 
in impartially upholding law and order’ (News Letter, 4 February 1976). 
Some insight into the SDLP’s strategy can be gleaned from a meeting 
between Hume and Austin Currie with senior Irish officials in March 1976. Hume 
informed the Dublin officials that the SDLP hoped to capitalise on divisions within 
loyalism over the question of the acceptability of continuing direct rule:  
There was a lot of fermentation on the loyalist side. Direct rule was bound to 
create divisions among them. There was a strong stream of thought which 
favoured resistance to letting the British deny them devolved government and 
an ascendancy of power. The SDLP strategy was to exploit these differences 
in the hope that there would be an increasing clamour for the return of 
devolved government even on a partnership basis (NAI, DT, 2006/133/691, 
Note by Sean Donlon: Northern Ireland, 8 January 1976).    
Most unionists, however, were unmoved by the SDLP’s tactics. Before the second 
session of the Convention commenced, Paisley informed the chairman that the 
UUUC was not even willing ‘to discuss the question of power-sharing’ (PRONI, 
CONV/1/3, meeting with UUUC leader, 19 January 1976). And in early February 
1976, he asked the Secretary of State ‘to knock SDLP’s heads together and tell them 
to forget about power sharing’ (PRONI, CONV/1/3, meeting with UUUC leaders, 9 
February 1976). 
Later that month, the SDLP met face-to-face with UUUC leaders. Gerry Fitt 
asked if the UUUC would ever countenance sharing power with his party. Harry 
West informed him they would not do so ‘now and as far as he could see ahead.’ By 
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contrast, John Hume claimed (earnestly or not) that even if the SDLP could form a 
majority administration with the UPNI and Alliance, it would still seek the UUUC’s 
participation in government, although it is impossible to judge the sincerity of this 
claim (PRONI, CONV/1/3, meeting between SDLP and UUUC, 12 February 1976).  
The policy of the UUUC was designed to break the SDLP’s resolve, forcing it to 
accept a return of the old Stormont. West informed Sir Robert Lowry that the UUUC 
believed the ‘SDLP were just about to crack and would cave in as the end of the 
Convention approached. They would soon be out of job and would grasp at anything’ 
(PRONI, CONV/1/3, meeting with UUUC leaders, 16 February 1976).   
Neither the SDLP, nor the British government, however, would accept a 
settlement without power-sharing. With little chance of the gulf between the sides 
narrowing, Rees revoked the Convention on 4 March 1976. Its report, calling for a 
return to Stormont, was ignored by the government (McDaid, 2013, p. 176).  
Some unionists, notably Faulkner’s UPNI, were still willing to share power with 
the SDLP (NAI, DT, 2006/133/691, Note by Sean Donlon: Northern Ireland, 8 
January 1976). Faulkner attempted to convince the UUUC that despite the SDLP’s, 
‘long term aspirations’, it had ‘realised that a United Ireland was not on in the 
foreseeable future.’ They were ‘loyal and able colleagues’, who adhered to the 
principle of collective responsibility in government. Harry West’s dismissed Faulkner, 
claiming that the SDLP were ‘Republicans determined to destroy Northern Ireland’ 
(PRONI, CONV/1/3, meeting between UPNI and UUUC, 5 February 1976). William 
Craig, meanwhile, insisted that the minority could not be ‘fobbed off’ with anything 
less than full ministerial responsibility in any administration. However, his insistence 
that power-sharing was widely supported in the community seems naively optimistic 
given the attitudes of the UUUC. Thereafter, the gulf between Faulkner, Craig, and 
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the UUUC widened. Paisley castigated both men for advocating working in 
government with the SDLP (Kiely, 1976). He had earlier claimed that: ‘if you lie down 
with republican dogs, you’ll rise with republican fleas’ (Irish Times, 22 January 1976). 
Despite the UUUC’s anti- power-sharing stance, talks between the SDLP and 
the UUP occurred between April and September 1976. During the discussions, both 
parties stated their preference for the return of devolved government with more 
powers than the Sunningdale Assembly (McKittrick, 1976). However, the talks were 
dropped by the UUP because of its membership’s refusal to consider power-sharing 
(O’Connor, 1976). Despite unionist intransigence, the SDLP continued to espouse 
power-sharing within a UK framework.  
At its 1976 conference, the party restated its commitment to power-sharing, 
and was not dogmatic about the form it should take. Party chairman, Denis Haughey, 
confirmed that the SDLP was ‘prepared to talk to any group of elected 
representatives at any time about any framework of government either inside or 
outside the U.K.’ (SDLP, 1976). Furthermore, the previous month, the SDLP affirmed 
that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK for as long as the majority so wish 
(Irish Times, 17 November 1976). Despite the party’s obvious frustration with 
unionism, a motion calling for a British declaration of intent to withdraw was narrowly 
defeated (Irish Press, 6 December 1976).8 The following year, however, the party’s 
frustration increased, inspired by dogmatic unionists.   
Elements within the UUUC, particularly Paisley and Baird, pressured the 
government to implement the Convention report. However, the UUUC was beginning 
to show signs of possible collapse. Some senior UUP members advocated 
administrative rather than legislative devolution (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 108). This 
scheme was the brainchild of Westminster MPs James Molyneaux and Enoch 
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Powell (Jackson, 2003, p. 284). Administrative devolution was an attempt to 
reconcile Powell and Molyneaux’s preference for closer integration with the 
devolutionist desires of the party rank-and-file. Overall, however, the UUP remained 
committed to the return of a parliament resembling the old Stormont – which, as 
Prime Minister James Callaghan confirmed, could only occur if power-sharing 
returned (House of Commons Debates, 24 November 1976, vol. 921, col. 35). 
The UUP’s governing body, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), stated that 
many unionists could not view anything but Stormont as ‘being a lawful government’. 
It compared unionist trauma at losing Stormont to ‘that of the citizens of Prague who 
wakened one morning to find Russian tanks in their streets (UUC, 1977a).’ Echoing 
Paisley, it likened direct rule to colonial government, not ‘answerable directly’ to 
Ulster’s electorate (UUC, 1977b).   
Some dogmatic unionists decided to directly challenge to the government in 
May 1977, in the form of the United Unionist Action Council (UUAC) strike, organised 
by Paisley and Baird, which sought tougher security measures against republicans. 
The strike, however, collapsed in just ten days; there were three deaths. It was not 
supported by the UUP, the Orange Order, or much of the unionist public (Patterson 
and Kaufmann, 2007, p. 249). The power-station workers, whose support proved 
decisive during the 1974 strike, refused to participate unless the ‘people of Northern 
Ireland had showed themselves clearly in favour of the strike’ (McKittrick, 1977a). 
James Molyneaux condemned the UUAC’s ‘campaign of anarchy’ as ‘an exact 
parallel’ of the civil rights demonstrations of 1968 and 1969 (O’Clery, 1977a).  
The collapse of the strike demonstrated the tensions within unionism between 
those prepared to confront the government in pursuit of devolution, and those 
increasingly content with direct rule. Rees’s replacement as Secretary of State, Roy 
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Mason, took a tough line against the IRA. This was welcomed by unionists. He also 
oversaw the ‘Ulsterisation’ of the security forces, which began under Rees. The 
policy led to considerable short-term security successes, assuring Mason’s 
popularity among unionists (Lee, 1989, p. 451).  Despite opposing the strike, the 
UUP was no less dogmatically opposed to power-sharing than the UUAC. 
Molyneaux even blamed the SDLP for initiating the campaign of terrorism blighting 
Northern Ireland in 1969 (a year before its formation). Under ‘no circumstances’, 
therefore, would the UUP share power with nationalists (Hennigan, 1977). Against 
this background, it has been argued, the SDLP reverted to a more traditional 
nationalist position (Tonge, 2002, p. 70). 
At its 1977 conference, the SDLP endorsed the policy document entitled 
Facing Reality. It called for an inter-governmental approach to the Northern Ireland 
problem. Journalist David McKittrick wrote that the document, with its emphasis on 
cross-border approaches, was intended to unite diverging views within the party. It 
satisfied ‘the withdrawal boys because they see it going some way towards their 
point of view’, whilst the anti-withdrawal faction accepted it ‘because it stops short of 
calling for withdrawal’ (McKittrick, 1977b). Nevertheless, it again emphasised that 
power-sharing (or partnership) must be at the heart of any political settlement 
(SDLP, 1977a). This echoed the SDLP’s local election manifesto which championed 
the ‘partnership’ strategy over ‘the domination of one tradition over the other’, which 
could only result in further violence (SDLP, 1977b). In any case, neither dogmatic 
unionists, nor militant republicans, were persuaded by the SDLP’s case.  
 
The triumph of the dogmatists 
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In an attempt to seize the initiative, Roy Mason tried to devise a new form of interim 
devolution that might progress towards full devolution in the future (Irish Times, 24 
November 1977). This would involve the ‘transfer of real powers to a partnership 
administration’, with a ‘fair share’ of these powers ‘going to the minority’ (PRONI, 
CENT/1/7/6, Note of discussions on politics between Mr Mason and Mr Judd and 
Irish Ministers, 5 May 1978). However, the UUP rejected the proposals as 
inadequate, whilst the SDLP held firm in its desire for a ‘power-sharing government’ 
(O’Clery 1977b; McKittrick 1977c). As the New Year began in 1978, the gulf between 
the pragmatists and dogmatists was as evident as ever.  
This trend was typified by the dogmatic unionists, who remained resolutely 
opposed to any form of power-sharing. The UUP’s governing body, the UUC, 
continued its opposition to power-sharing. This was partly explained by the 
increasing acceptance of direct rule among unionists. Roy Mason’s ‘approach to 
security’, was ‘more constructive and realistic’ than his predecessor, Merlyn Rees. 
The UUC commended Mason for his ‘sympathetic understanding of the tribulations 
of the Ulster people’ (UUC, 1978). This did little to diminish the dogmatic opposition 
of most unionists towards power-sharing, which considerably increased frustration 
among the SDLP and its supporters.    
SDLP frustrations were also roused by the statements of politicians from the 
Republic, who seemed unsympathetic towards nationalist demands. Garret 
FitzGerald, for example, claimed to have informed ‘Protestants from the Shankill’ 
road that the Republic was ‘“so partitionist a State that Northern Protestants would 
be bloody fools to join it”’ (Irish Times, 12 February 1978). Thus the SDLP 
occasionally faced indifference from the political classes in the Republic, at a time 
when it was trying to ward off the challenge of PSF in nationalist areas (Murray and 
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Tonge, 2005, p. 55).9 Republican prisoners were engaged in a ‘dirty protest’, against 
the revocation of ‘Special Category’ status for those convicted of politically motivated 
offences (PRONI, NIO, 12/68A, the protest in the Maze prison, 9 October 1978). This 
high-profile protest caused serious difficulties for moderate SDLP supporters, whose 
members suffered attacks from PSF supporters in areas such as North Belfast. The 
party chided PSF for its violent behaviour, noting that there was ‘something 
dangerously irrational about people who protest about the ill-treatment of prisoners 
by brutally attacking and kicking members of the SDLP at a peaceful political 
meeting.’ The party further condemned the PIRA’s unjustifiable ‘campaign of 
murders’ (SDLP, 1978). More serious politically, however, was the continued hostility 
which the SDLP was subjected to by unionists, who refused to countenance a role 
for nationalists in the future governance for Northern Ireland.  
The UUP party conference of 1978 only served to confirm the widening gulf 
between pragmatists and dogmatists. James Molyneaux reiterated calls for 
administrative devolution, in the form of an upper tier of local government (Irish 
Times, 21 October 1978) The UUP, however, remained committed to a majority-rule 
system. Indeed, the ‘very word “power-sharing” was enough to evoke growls of 
disapproval from the delegates, and there were no suggestions, public or private … 
of any other way of involving non-Unionists either in local government of a devolved 
parliament’ (O’Clery, 1978a). Roy Mason, who was reportedly sympathetic towards 
unionism, had earlier noted how ‘intransigent’ the UUP had been in refusing to 
‘consider anything other than the majority Convention Report’ (PRONI, Central 
Secretariat (CENT)/1/7/6, note of discussions on politics between Mr Mason and Mr 
Judd and Irish Ministers, 5 May 1978). In such circumstances, it is not difficult to 
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comprehend why the SDLP’s rhetoric began to harden, as evident at its party 
conference the following month.  
The SDLP’s 1978 conference passed a motion declaring that British 
disengagement from Northern Ireland was ‘both inevitable and desirable.’ 
Nevertheless, party front-benchers, such as Austin Currie, stressed that this was not 
a call for immediate disengagement. To do so before creating ‘stable political 
institutions in Northern Ireland would be disastrous’ (O’Clery, 1978b). Despite this 
call, the SDLP had not abandoned power-sharing within the UK. Gerard Murray has 
argued that the party was simply ‘reappraising its method of achieving this policy’ 
(Murray, 1998, p. 61). Indeed, as P. J. McLoughlin (2010, pp.86-8) has pointed out, 
the motion itself stated that British disengagement should only occur as part of an 
overall solution with ‘guarantees for both traditions in the North.’ The party’s 
emphasis on a new, British-Irish approach to the problem was understandable, given 
the stance of dogmatic unionists. It also helped the SDLP fend off the challenge of 
the Irish Independence Party (IIP), which was little more than a non-violent version of 
PSF. However, the majority of unionists had already decided to dogmatically pursue 
the return of Stormont at all costs.  
This was confirmed in early 1979, when UUP rejected Roy Mason’s above-
mentioned interim devolution proposals (McKittrick, 1979). Nevertheless, the British 
Labour government remained committed to the principle of power-sharing. At a 
meeting on 17 January 1979, Mason informed the Irish foreign minister Michael 
O’Kennedy that ‘what we want – and we can be in agreement with you on this – is 
the establishment of a devolved government in Northern Ireland on a basis which 
both parts of the community can sustain and support. This means a partnership 
government with safeguards for the minority.’ Further, Mason unequivocally ruled out 
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a return to the old Stormont system. Unionists, he stated, ‘now realise that they will 
not get a return to majority rule. This is a tremendous advance, for majority rule is, 
after all, the democratic norm’ (PRONI, NIO/12/138, note by K. G. Jones, meeting 
between Mr O’Kennedy and Secretary of State, 17 January 1979). Most unionists, 
however, were determined that a Stormont-style system would be restored. The 
UUP 1979 conference heard motions demanding the ‘same measure of self-
government as was enjoyed in the peaceful years 1922-69’ in Northern Ireland 
(UUP, 1979).  
On 3 May 1979, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives ousted Jim Callaghan’s 
Labour administration in the Westminster elections. The Northern Ireland party 
manifestos discussed their respective views on power-sharing. Unionist parties 
supported devolution, but opposed power-sharing. The SDLP was accused of 
shifting further towards the ‘green end of the spectrum’. However, whilst open to 
exploring options such as federalism, and taking an increasingly critical view of 
British policy – which it was felt gave a guarantee to unionists and fuelled their 
intransigence – the party and its members left the option of devolution within the UK 
open. This was in contrast to its rivals the IIP, which ‘continued to hard on [sic] their 
single theme of British withdrawal’ (PRONI, CENT/1/8/17, Election Manifestos', (25 
April 1979), Memorandum by A. Huckle). The Conservative government, however, 
was committed to power-sharing devolution.  
At a meeting between Humphrey Atkins and Irish government ministers in 
June 1979, the position of the SDLP was discussed. Atkins stated that ‘both the 
Conservative Party manifesto and the Queen’s Speech’ made clear that his 
government was ‘committed to establishing some form of devolved government in 
Northern Ireland and his party’s credentials were good in that respect.’ However, he 
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asked that Irish ministers refrain from making statements referring to ‘power-sharing’ 
since ‘unionists in general, and the DUP in particular, were forced into their corners 
by such talk.’ His aim was to ‘reassure both communities in the Province and move 
gradually towards a political forum acceptable to both’ (PRONI, CENT/1/8/44, Note 
of Meeting in Dublin between the Secretary of State and Ministers of the 
Government of the Republic of Ireland, 27 June 1979). Most unionists, however, 
rejected this approach, and the stalemate continued. Despite this, a small minority of 
unionists continued to support power-sharing.   
In the summer of 1979, the UPNI publicly stated its continued commitment to 
power-sharing with nationalists who were prepared to work within a UK framework. 
The party leader, Anne Dickson, said the UPNI would ‘strive for agreement between 
the political parties that will allow all Ulster men who accept the constitution and 
support the forces of law and order to have the opportunity to participate in 
government’ (Nolan, 1979).10 Whilst the UPNI only attracted minor electoral support, 
it was not the only political grouping which contained pragmatic unionists. The cross-
community Alliance party, whose membership primarily comprised moderate 
unionists, also continued to favour power-sharing devolution. Its leader, Oliver 
Napier, called on the government to attempt to create ‘structures of devolved 
government which guarantee[d] full participation to all major sections of the 
community’ (Irish Times, 24 September 1979).  
Thus, the division between the two primary ethnic blocs was by no means 
total. And, despite the late 1970s being described as a period during which the SDLP 
underwent a ‘greening’ process, and its rhetorical allusions towards a (highly 
conditional) British disengagement, that party continued to pursue power-sharing 
within the UK (Murray and Tonge, 2005, p. 61).11    
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SDLP policy documents published throughout 1979 confirmed its commitment 
to partnership government with unionists. Its Westminster election manifesto stated 
that, since 1973, the party’s policy had not changed ‘because the problem [had] not 
changed’ (SDLP, 1979a). Partnership between the two traditions in Northern Ireland, 
and between both parts of Ireland, the Sunningdale formula, was strongly desired. 
Some months later, the party published an extensive document which re-examined 
its present policies entitled Towards a New Ireland: A Policy Review. Here, whilst 
calling for ‘joint Anglo-Irish action’ to break the political impasse, the emphasis 
remained on power-sharing within Northern Ireland. The SDLP’s approach 
necessarily meant ‘partnership between the differing traditions in the North, and 
partnership between both parts of Ireland’. It was not ‘irrevocably committed to any 
one system of power-sharing’, but sought the removal of guarantees for one section 
of society and a commitment to achieving a situation in which there were ‘guarantees 
for all’ (SDLP, 1979b). In this, the SDLP retained its pragmatic approach – a 
willingness to compromise its united Ireland ideology through the acceptance of 
power-sharing devolution within the UK.  
The approach of the SDLP was in sharp contrast to that of dogmatic 
nationalist parties such as the IIP and PSF. The latter consistently espoused its Éire 
Nua policy, adopted in 1971, which sought British withdrawal, and the creation of an 
independent, federal, socialist Ireland. By this stage, its hard-line republican rival, 
OSF, had abandoned its dogmatic opposition to the Sunningdale formula and 
clarified its willingness to work towards a ‘32 county democratic socialist Republic of 
Ireland through a devolved government within Northern Ireland buttressed by an 
extended bill of rights’ (PRONI, CENT1/8/17, election manifestos, A. E. Huckle, 25 
April 1979). However, the genuineness of its commitment was questionable given 
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the refusal of its military wing, the OIRA, to desist from terrorism (Rekawek, 2011). 
The SDLP was thus, in real terms, the only nationalist party earnestly committed to 
working peacefully with unionists within a UK framework. Most, but not all, unionists, 
however, did not reciprocate. 
 
Conclusion 
Examining the attitudes of various political groups towards devolution during the 
1970s provides a fresh way of interpreting how the Northern Ireland conflict evolved 
as it did. Discussions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional future echoed wider 
debates about devolution in Great Britain during that decade, although the form they 
took in Northern Ireland was, given its particular circumstances, quite distinct 
(Mitchell, 2009; Bogdanor, 2001). Such an examination has demonstrated that the 
existing accounts of the Northern Ireland conflict, inspired by consociational theory, 
are in need of revision. The primary source evidence challenges the assumption that 
the historic divisions between nationalists and unionists were the most significant 
barrier to the creation of a power-sharing settlement.  
 Rather, the division between pragmatists prepared to work within the 
parameters established by successive governments and accept power-sharing 
devolution within the UK and dogmatists who were unwilling to do so was a greater 
obstacle. The pragmatic bloc included the SDLP, the dominant voice of Northern 
Ireland nationalists at this time. That party was willing to shelve its goal of a united 
Ireland in exchange for a share of power in a devolved UK administration for 
Northern Ireland. Whilst there was some hardening of the SDLP’s rhetoric, and 
considerable debate about the policy of pursuing power-sharing, this is best 
understood in context of dogmatic unionists’ ‘reluctance to accept the principle of 
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power-sharing’ (Murray and Tonge, 2005, p. 60). This was ‘inevitable’, but did not 
mean the abandonment of a willingness to accept power-sharing within the UK, had 
this been available (McLoughlin, 2010, p. 88). In this, the party had significantly 
moderated from its 1972 position, when it sought joint British and Irish sovereignty in 
Northern Ireland. The pragmatic faction also contained some unionists, including 
most of Faulkner’s former pledged UUP group, which later became the UPNI. 
Moderate unionists within the Alliance party were also prepared to accept 
nationalists in government, within a devolved UK administration. Pragmatic unionists 
recognised that accepting nationalists in government was the only way of securing 
the return of devolution and a meaningful say in the affairs of Northern Ireland.  
This British commitment to power-sharing was true of successive Westminster 
governments, both Labour and Conservative (Aveyard, 2012; McDaid, 2013). Cillian 
McGrattan has claimed that the main theme in British policy towards Northern 
Ireland during this period and beyond was the ‘absence of a long-term or consistent 
policy vision on the part of the British government’ and an ‘overabundance of 
competing voices within the decision making apparatus’ (McGrattan, 2010b, p. 89). 
And Brendan O’Leary has suggested that Thatcher favoured the full ‘administrative 
integration’ of Northern Ireland with the rest of the UK, with no serious consideration 
of Irish nationalists (O’Leary, 1997, pp. 663-4). Neither of these views, however, 
accord with the archival evidence presented here. Indeed, even after the 1970s, the 
Thatcher administration refused to restore devolution which did not ‘provide a 
worthwhile role for the minority community’, whilst being ‘broadly acceptable to the 
people of Northern Ireland as a whole’ (PRONI, CENT/1/8/44, record of Secretary of 
State’s meeting with the Irish Foreign Minister, 13 October 1980).12 
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However, whilst a majority of nationalists were part of the pragmatic bloc, the 
opposite was true of unionists.  The majority of the UUP, DUP and VUPP sought the 
return of devolution, but only if it was the same kind of devolution as pertained under 
Stormont. This meant there could be no role for nationalists, even the non-violent 
SDLP which, as Faulkner had pointed out, had already proven itself capable of 
working for the benefit of Northern Ireland. This, in effect, ensured the continuance of 
direct rule, since the government would not allow a settlement along the lines 
preferred by dogmatic unionists.   
Ironically, other members of the dogmatic bloc were unionists’ sworn 
enemies, the hard-line republicans of PSF and the PIRA and the IIP. These groups 
sought British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, and the PIRA pursued a campaign 
of often indiscriminate violence to achieve this aim. Thus, power-sharing did not fail 
simply because of government inaction or a lack of commitment to the concept, as 
argued by Kerr and O’Leary. Blaming the government ignores the fact that most 
unionists opposed power-sharing, opposition hardened by republican violence. The 
SDLP’s presentation of the proposed Council of Ireland as a body more threatening 
to unionist interests than was actually the case also heightened opposition to the 
overall settlement. Power-sharing failed because of determination of dogmatists, on 
both sides, to defeat it. This grouping included both terrorists and democratic 
politicians (Kerr, 2011).  
 This is not to suggest that ethnic cleavages are unimportant to understanding 
Northern Ireland’s conflict. Recent research indicates that ethnic identities continue 
to manifest themselves clearly in electoral competitions today (McGlynn et al., 2014). 
Nor is it suggested that the current institutions, based on consociational principles, 
have not provided a workable institutional framework for co-operation between 
 32 
 
nationalists and unionists (although the current institutions were the product of 
protracted negotiations in the context of paramilitary ceasefires). What is at issue is 
the explanatory utility of consociationalist scholarship. Evidence from the 1970s 
demonstrates that such consociational accounts fail to fully understand the nuances 
of the region’s ethnic politics during the 1970s. At a time when Northern Ireland is 
being held as an example for the resolution of conflicts in other divided societies, a 
fuller understanding of these nuances is all the more necessary.13   
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 McGarry and O’Leary have themselves highlighted shortcomings in ‘classic 
consociational theory’, but are ‘critical consociationalists, not anti-consociationalists’. 
See (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006, pp. 249-277).    
2
 Consociationalism has also been critiqued for both its conceptual fluidity and 
tendency to reinforce division rather than promote integration. See e.g. (Dixon 2005, 
pp. 357-67).  
3
 Alliance was, de facto, a moderate unionist party that attempted to bridge the 
sectarian divide. The other non-sectarian party was the Northern Ireland Labour 
Party, which was pro-power-sharing. However, it attracted even less support than 
Alliance, an average of 1.7 per cent support in all elections it contested during the 
1970s, and failed to make a significant impact in debates about Northern Ireland’s 
future.  
4
 The DUP, by contrast, was unencumbered by the UUP’s anomalous structure, and 
its policy was firmly under its leader, Ian Paisley’s, control. See Bruce, 2007, pp. 
103-05  
 33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 ARK, Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention Elections, 1975. Available from: 
http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fc75.htm (accessed 1 March 2014).  
6
 Faulkner had resigned as UUP leader in January 1974 having lost an Ulster 
Unionist Council vote on the ratification of the Sunningdale Agreement. However, he 
remained in post as Chief Executive until May 1974. 
7
 There were suggestions, in December 1975, that Craig’s power-sharing proposals 
were merely tactical. He: ‘still wanted the form of government advocated in the 
UUUC report, but was prepared to accept a voluntary coalition with SDLP for a few 
years in order to get it.’ See PRONI, CONV/1/ 9, Maurice Hayes to Ian Burns, 5 
December 1975.  
8
 The motion was opposed by John Hume. See, McLoughlin (2010, p. 82). The 
southern opposition party, Fianna Fáil, called for such a declaration the previous 
year, thus the SDLP policy towards Irish unity was officially more moderate than that 
of a party in the Irish Republic, (Irish Times, 30 October 1975). Gerry Fitt chided the 
Fianna Fáil leader, Jack Lynch for advocating withdrawal, claiming Lynch had ‘put 
himself in the Provisional I.R.A. camp’ in so doing, (Irish Times, 3 November 1975).  
9
 Fianna Fáil’s ambiguous position towards the SDLP can be seen in their chiding of 
Jack Lynch for pushing the Irish dimension ‘into the background’ in 1979 (Irish 
Times, 23 November 1979). There was a gulf between Fianna Fáil’s rhetoric in 
opposition and their Northern Ireland policy in government. The Irish government’s 
European Court of Human Rights case against the British government regarding the 
torture of detainees in Northern Ireland arguably masked covert improvements in 
British-Irish relations, particularly security, under the 1973-77 coalition government 
(Patterson, 2013). And it did not equate to a desire for British withdrawal. It was 
regarded by the British as an irritant, and difficult to reconcile with Dublin’s largely 
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helpful approach on other matters (TNA, PREM 16/520, North–South security co-
operation, minute by ROI department, 10 September 1975).  
10
 Dickson replaced Faulkner as UPNI leader, following his untimely death in 1977.  
11
 See also Bew and Patterson’s (1985, p. 99) critique of the ‘agreed Ireland’. Their 
critique is valid at the ideological level, but it ignores the party’s willingness to work 
within a UK framework.  
12
 The following year, a briefing note for Atkins, prepared prior to his meeting with US 
Vice-President George H.W. Bush, confirmed this was government policy. It stated 
that ‘The unionists would like us to revive the devolved system – with a permanent 
unionist majority – which prevailed for 50 years before 1972; but that we will not do, 
since it would be totally unacceptable to the Catholics.’ Likewise, the government 
was ‘not prepared’ to move towards Irish unity ‘against the will of that [unionist] 
majority.’ See PRONI, NIO/12/197A, draft note, Vice-President Bush, 3 July 1981.   
13
 For a critique, see O’Kane, 2010; Wilson, 2010.  
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